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ABSTRACT 
 
KRISTEN BELL:  Uncompromising Mercy 
(Under the direction of Gerald Postema) 
 
 
Tension reigns between mercy and justice.  Mercy seasons justice – it gives less than 
what justice mandates – and in that sense, it requires a departure from justice.  But a 
departure from justice is unjust.  On the other hand, if mercy is not distinct from justice, then 
it is redundant.  Mercy would not be mercy, it would simply be justice.  Mercy either 
undermines or collapses into justice, rendering it apparently impossible to be both just and 
merciful.  If mercy is to have an appropriate place in a criminal justice system that prizes 
justice, we must articulate an uncompromising mercy; a mercy that compromises neither 
justice nor itself.  In this thesis, I argue that mercy is uncompromising when it is given not 
for reasons of justice, but for other good reasons that do not conflict with justice.  I argue that 
one such reason is that the punisher stands in a relation of liability toward the offender.      
 iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..…………………………….…………………………………1 
II. UNDERSTANDING MERCY AND JUSTICE..…………………………………3 
III. SEARCHING FOR GROUNDS OF MERCY..…….………………………….....8 
IV. LOCATING GROUNDS FOR MERCY..……………………………………….14 
Relations and appropriate responses to wrongdoing..……………...………........16 
The relation of liability………………………………..………………………....22 
The state’s relation of liability toward victims of child abuse…..……………….30 
The state’s narrowly appropriate response toward abused offenders……………32 
The state’s broadly appropriate response toward abused offenders……………..35 
V. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES……………………………………………...44 
VI. EXTENDED APPLICATION…………………………………………………...47 
VII. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………..49 
WORKS CITED...……………………………………………………………………….51 
 
 
 
 
 
Uncompromising Mercy1 
 
 “Until you put these things right, you’re not entitled to boast of the justice meted out 
to thieves…You allow these people to be brought up in the worst possible way, and 
systematically corrupted from their earliest years.  Finally, when they grow up and commit 
the crimes that they were obviously destined to commit, ever since they were children, you 
start punishing them.  In other words, you create thieves, and then punish them for stealing!” 
—Thomas More, Utopia 
I.  Introduction 
David Woods robbed and murdered 77-year-old Juan Placencia by stabbing him 20 
times in 1984.  The state of Indiana executed Woods in 2007.  Woods was severely 
physically and psychologically abused as a child.  His father abandoned the family and his 
mother neglected and abused Woods.  She would lock the refrigerator and only reward the 
children with food when they stole for her.  She hosted a motorcycle gang in her home that 
sadistically tortured Woods and carried out sexual acts in front of him.  The state removed 
Woods from his mother’s custody when he was fourteen and rotated him through a series of 
inadequate foster homes.  At age nineteen, Woods murdered Placencia and at age forty-two, 
Woods was executed.2     
At the thought of the brutal murder of an elderly man, we want punishment to the 
fullest extent of the law.  At the thought of Woods as a victim of horrific abuse and other 
social ills, we are inclined to show mercy.  The inclination to show mercy stands in direct 
                                                 
1 The title, “Uncompromising Mercy,” was influenced by Pamela Heironymi’s article, “Articulating an 
Uncompromising Forgiveness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, May, 2001.   
 
2 Woods v. McBride, 430 F.3d 813 (2005).  Also see Amnesty International, “USA (Indiana): Death penalty / 
Legal concern: David Leon Woods,” 13 April 2007.  Retrieved from  
http://archive.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510722007?open&of=ENG-2AM. 
 2
conflict with the thought that the offender did something dreadfully wrong.  Mercy for that 
murderer?  How could one simultaneously hold such conflicting thoughts in one’s mind?  
The difficulty in responding to this conflict leads many of us to try to diminish the conflict in 
one way or another.  Some reject the inclination to show mercy by reminding themselves that 
Woods knew right from wrong despite the abuse he suffered and that many children who 
suffer abuse do not grow up to commit murder.  Others reject the inclination to punish to the 
fullest extent of the law.  Into one’s mind comes the philosophical toolkit to show that the 
offender was not really responsible for his action or the action was not really as wrong as we 
initially thought.  Carefully reinterpreted, the crime is not so bad – after all, he didn’t really 
mean to do that – and we can feel comfortable diminishing punishment.  For many of us, 
however, neither tack is satisfying.  We want a reason to show Woods mercy without 
diminishing his culpability, but such reasons do not come readily to mind.   
I will present an analysis of mercy that aptly accommodates deeply conflicting 
intuitions about such cases.  The analysis does not explain away the conflict we feel, but fully 
appreciates it and argues for what should follow from it.  The argument suggests that we 
should show offenders like Woods mercy without compromising the thought that they 
deserve severe punishment.   To be upfront, the primary goal of the paper is not to analyze 
this case in particular, but to analyze mercy and its relationship to criminal justice.  On the 
basis of my analysis, I argue that mercy should have a constrained place in criminal justice.  
An advantage of my analysis is that it aptly accommodates our conflicting intuitions about 
crimes like the one described above.   
In Part II, I clarify the terms mercy and justice and argue alongside John Tasioulas 
that most of the incompatibility between them is merely apparent.   In Part III, I raise a 
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problem for Tasioulas’ analysis of the relationship between mercy and justice.  If mercy is to 
have an appropriate place in the law, we must show that it is not merely permissible to show 
mercy but that we have solid grounds from which to argue that we should show mercy. In 
Part IV, the main section of the paper, I articulate one justifiable ground for mercy, namely 
that the state ought to show mercy when it stands in a relation of liability toward the 
offender.  This condition is particularly clear when the offender has suffered horrific child 
abuse.  In Part V, I consider two objections to my view.  In Part VI, I outline other cases in 
which mercy may be appropriate.  It is not my aim, however, to articulate an exhaustive list 
of all of the instances in which mercy is appropriate.  It is my aim to show that there is good 
reason to exercise mercy in the courtroom, albeit with considerable restraint.    
 
II.  Understanding Mercy and Justice 
A clarification of the term mercy is necessary before continuing.  For the purpose of 
this paper, “mercy” will mean giving an offender less punishment than she deserves through 
some form of special concern for the offender herself.  By “giving an offender less than she 
deserves,” I mean giving the offender less severe punishment than that mandated by a 
sophisticated retributive norm. Mercy as understood here thus presupposes a retributive 
framework.3  To make sense of giving a person less severe punishment than she deserves, we 
assume that we can make sense of the person deserving some degree of severity in 
punishment.  Various theories of retributive punishment give accounts of what it means to 
deserve a specific degree of punishment for crime.  Despite their differences, these theories 
                                                 
 
3 It is generally assumed that mercy understood in any reasonable sense, not just the sense that I have stipulated, 
must presuppose a retributive framework and is impossible in a strictly utilitarian framework.  Andrew Brien 
challenges this assumption in “Mercy, Utilitarianism, and Retributivism,” Philosophia 24 (1995): 493-521. 
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share the idea that there is some degree of punishment that offenders should receive which is 
proportionate to their culpability.  The proportionate degree of punishment, the ‘just deserts,’ 
is generally determined as a function of the quality of an offender’s will and the degree of 
harm or insult caused by the crime. 4   
To be clear, mercy as understood here is distinct from equity and clemency.  Equity is 
giving an offender exactly what she deserves given all the particulars of the situation.  An 
equitable judgment may give an offender less severe punishment than what is determined by 
general laws that either do not or cannot take particulars into account.  An equitable 
judgment, however, does not give the offender less severe punishment than what is 
demanded by the retributive norm applied to the most specific, particularized understanding 
of the case at hand.  Equity is thus not mercy because mercy is giving an offender less than 
she deserves, not exactly what she deserves.5    
Pardon or clemency does involve giving an offender less than she deserves.  Pardon is 
distinct from mercy, however, because it is granted on the basis of what is most beneficial for 
society as a whole.6  Mercy is granted through some form of special concern for the offender, 
not on the basis of general utility.  Ford made the political move of pardoning Nixon for the 
                                                 
 
4 Note that one can recognize the retributive norm without advocating that the state should always punish on the 
basis of this norm.  One who recognizes the retributive norm affirms that it makes sense to speak of ‘just 
deserts,’ of offenders deserving an amount of punishment proportionate to their crime.  A retributivist argues 
that the state should dole out these ‘just deserts’ to criminal offenders.    
 
5 Aristotle champions equity as the correction of law according to principles of justice when the law is too 
general or abstract to aptly apply in particular situations (Book V, Chapter X, Nicomachean Ethics).  Alwynne 
Smart points out that most cases of “mercy” are really misnamed cases of equity.  She goes on to discuss cases 
of “genuine mercy” in which we have reason to give the offender less than the proportional punishment 
(“Mercy,” Philosophy 43 (1968):  345-359).  Her discussion of “genuine mercy,” however, seems to slide back 
into equity (see criticism from Jeff Murphy in Forgiveness and Mercy and from Roberts, H.R.T, “Mercy,” 
Philosophy 46 (1971):  352-353). 
 
6 By ‘pardon,’ I mean what most people think of as a justifiable pardon – not a pardon that results from some 
form of cronyism.  This latter form of pardon probably would meet my definition of mercy. 
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good of the nation, but he did not necessarily show him mercy.  A police officer might not 
give a speeding driver the ticket she deserves because he is too lazy to pull her over and/or 
fill in the paperwork, but this is not showing her mercy on my account.  For similar reasons, 
mercy does not generally cover giving a reduced sentence as a result of a plea bargain or 
giving a sentence determined on purely deterrent grounds that is less than what the offender 
deserves on retributive grounds.  What is missing here is some form of special concern 
toward the offender.7  
I should also note that showing mercy does not necessarily entail reducing the time of 
a prison sentence.  As stated above, mercy involves giving an offender less than she deserves 
and this means giving the offender less severe punishment than that mandated by a 
sophisticated retributive norm.  By “less severe,” I mean “less of a negative impact on the 
offender’s long run utility.”   One way for punishment to be less severe is for it to last for a 
shorter period of time.  Another way for punishment to be less severe, however, is for it to 
last just as long, but to involve less suffering.  A third way for punishment to be less severe is 
for it to be effectively geared toward improving the offender’s life in the long run (generally 
this will involve the infliction of less suffering).  In this sense, a desire to reform prisons 
from places where offenders serve hard time to places where offenders are effectively 
rehabilitated can be interpreted as a desire to show mercy across the board.     
My aim is not to argue that mercy always or most paradigmatically means giving an 
offender less than she deserves through some form of special concern toward the offender.  
                                                 
 
7 There is a potential complication here.  An individual could hold that the state should never dole out 
punishment according to the retributive norm and her position may be rooted in a special regard for offenders.  
If this individual advocates for less punishment than the retributive norm demands, then she is arguably 
advocating for mercy as I have stipulated it.  She would be advocating, however, for universal mercy, or mercy 
across the board; not for mercy in particular cases.  Although I think this is a plausible position, I will not 
explore it – I am interested in arguments for mercy that turn out to apply in some cases but not all.     
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Indeed we often use the term mercy outside of a retributive framework or to refer to what I 
have called equity or clemency.  We may also feel uncomfortable seeing certain calls for 
penal reform as calls for mercy.  My aim is not to fully capture the broad conceptual structure 
of mercy or to explain all the ways in which we use the term.  Rather, I am assuming that we 
recognize the notion of giving an offender less than she deserves through some form of 
special concern.  I am henceforth calling this notion mercy and I am investigating how it may 
or may not have an appropriate place in criminal justice.  It seems acceptable to call this 
notion mercy even if it does not best capture the concept of mercy broadly-construed.8   
I also need to clarify my use of the term justice.  In this paper, justice will be used in 
three senses.  To be legally just is to remain within the bounds of the spirit of the law.  To be 
retributively just is to ensure that people receive their just deserts.  To be broadly, fully, or 
socially just is to be in accord with what is required by a theory of political justice.  The term 
criminal justice is short for the criminal justice system, it does not refer specifically to any of 
the above three kinds of justice.  A good criminal justice system, however, will be concerned 
with all three kinds of justice (although in some cases I will argue that a good criminal justice 
system should not guarantee retributive justice).   
Given this clarification of mercy and justice, I can begin my investigation into how 
mercy may or may not be appropriate in criminal justice.  On first glance, mercy and justice 
(in all three senses) seem incompatible.  Justice plays fair, mercy plays favorites.  Justice 
carefully apportions what is deserved, mercy shrugs in indifference.  The conflict between 
                                                 
 
8 The rough acceptability of my stipulation is supported by Seneca’s definition of mercy in De Clementia:  
“mercy can be described as an inclination of the mind towards mildness in exacting punishment…[it can also be 
described as] the moderation that removes something from the due and merited punishment…everybody 
understands the fact that mercy consists in stopping short of the penalty that might have been deservedly fixed.” 
Seneca Dialogues and Essays, Trans. John Davie (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 214. 
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justice and mercy is straightforwardly articulated by Saint Anselm.9  We begin with the 
thought that mercy is distinct from justice.  Mercy seasons justice – it gives less than what 
justice mandates.  In that sense, mercy requires a departure from justice.  But a departure 
from justice is unjust.  On the other hand, if mercy is not distinct from justice, then it is 
redundant.  It would be a mistake to say that mercy tempers or seasons justice.  Mercy would 
not be mercy, it would simply be justice.  Mercy either undermines or collapses into justice, 
rendering it apparently impossible to be both just and merciful.  If mercy is to have an 
appropriate place in a criminal justice system that prizes justice, we must articulate an 
uncompromising mercy; a mercy that compromises neither justice nor itself.    
 Numerous philosophers have attempted to dissipate the apparent conflict between 
justice and mercy.10  The conflict is merely apparent when we pay close attention to what we 
mean by mercy and justice.  Mercy is clearly a departure from retributive justice insofar as it 
gives the offender less than she deserves.  In this sense, mercy tempers (one kind of) justice 
and is distinct from it.  Mercy, however, need not be a departure from legal justice or social 
justice.  In this sense, mercy does not undermine (the two other kinds of) justice.  One might 
                                                 
 
9 Anselm discusses the conflict between mercy and justice in Proslogion, Chapter Nine.  Jeff Murphy aptly 
summarizes Anselm’s discussion in Forgiveness and Mercy (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 
168-169. 
 
10 Claudia Card dissipates the conflict by arguing that offenders can deserve mercy, but she makes this move at 
the cost of making mercy only superficially different from equity (see “On Mercy,” The Philosophical Review 
(April 1972):  182-207).  Jeff Murphy and P. Twambley argue that the conflict cannot be resolved under a 
public law model, but demonstrates that it can be resolved under a private law model in which mercy is a matter 
of a victim waiving her right to punish (see Jeff Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) and P. Twambley, “Mercy and Forgiveness,” Analysis 36 (1979): 84-
90). In his Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche explains the conflict by distinguishing two kinds of justice.  Mercy 
does conflict with society’s egalitarian view of justice, but mercy does not conflict with his ideal justice.  Mercy 
on his view is the self-sublimation of justice (for discussion of this view, see David Cartwright, “Revenge, 
Punishment, and Mercy: The Self Overcoming of Justice,” International Studies in Philosophy 17 (1985):  17-
26).  Each of these views has its appeals and drawbacks which will not be detailed here.   
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wonder how mercy can depart from retributive justice without departing from legal justice 
and social justice.   
John Tasioulas gives a convincing response. 11  He argues that the law grants a large 
degree of discretion in determinations of punishment.  Mercy is choosing the lenient option 
on the spectrum while staying within its bounds.  Thus mercy is within legal justice.  The 
judge, however, should not simply jump down to the lenient end whenever she pleases.  Such 
behavior would be capricious and arbitrary – surely threatening the spirit of legal justice 
which treats like cases alike and potentially threatening social justice as well.  Instead, judges 
ought to have good reasons for picking the lenient option.  That is, they must have 
appropriate grounds for mercy which make mercy appropriate in legal and social justice.  
These grounds for mercy cannot revise downwards the amount of punishment that is 
deserved or otherwise mercy will no longer be distinct from retributive justice.  Grounds for 
mercy do not change what the offender deserves, but rather challenge whether we ought to 
give the offender what he deserves.  From a broader perspective of justice, retributive justice 
is only one of our many concerns—grounds for mercy highlight our other concerns and put 
retributive justice in the back seat, or at least not in the driver’s seat.  The offender still 
deserves the same amount of punishment, but it is no longer of central importance to give 
him what he deserves.   
 
III.  Searching for grounds for mercy 
Tasioulas’ analysis of mercy hangs on articulating appropriate grounds for mercy.  If 
mercy is not grounded, it threatens legal and social justice and should arguably be kept out of 
                                                 
 
11 “Mercy,” Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London on Monday, 13 
January, 2003. 
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a criminal justice system.  The grounds for mercy which Tasioulas identifies, however, are 
unsatisfying.  He lists four paradigmatic grounds for mercy.  I will argue that the first two 
grounds are actually grounds for equity rather than mercy, the third ground is plausible but 
mysterious, and the fourth ground is not sufficiently justified.  I consider these grounds in 
turn.   
The first ground for mercy applies if the offender faced particularly difficult obstacles 
in doing the right thing.  For example, if a woman is continually beaten by her husband, we 
think it is harder for her to resist the temptation to kill him than it is for the rest of us and so 
we should be lenient in punishing her.  The grounds for leniency in this case, however, are 
grounds for equity not grounds for mercy.  The fact that the offender faces particularly 
difficult obstacles revises down the level of punishment that she actually deserves.  Her just 
deserts are determined by a function of the quality of her will and the degree of harm or 
insult she caused.  The obstacles suggest that her will was not as malicious as we might 
otherwise think and so they suggest that she deserves less than we might otherwise think.  
The obstacles call us to carefully consider exactly what she deserves, but do not give us 
reason to give her less punishment than she deserves.   
Tasioulas suggests that a second ground for mercy applies if the offender has already 
suffered a great deal due to his crime.  Consider a father who forgets to check his smoke 
detectors and his house burns down with his wife and children inside.  The loss of his family 
makes him suffer enough (indeed much more than enough), so we do not need to impose 
additional punishment for his negligence.  Here again, however, Tasioulas has pointed to 
grounds for something more like equity than mercy.  The retributive norm demands that the 
father suffer x units of punishment.  He is already suffering more than x units of punishment 
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through the loss of his family.  It would be unjust to give him more punishment because he 
does not deserve any more than x units.  A judge would not be merciful in not giving the 
father x units of punishment, she would simply be just.  There is no real leniency here – no 
reason to give the offender less than he deserves.  The focus here is on ensuring that he gets 
exactly what he deserves – no more, no less.   
Remorse is a third potential reason to be merciful.  Intuitively, remorse seems to be a 
good reason to show mercy.  It is difficult, however, to say exactly how this works.  Why 
should we give a remorseful offender less than he deserves?  It cannot be because he is 
already suffering lest we fall into the same problem sketched above.  It also cannot be 
because the remorse transforms the offender into a ‘new person.’  If the offender is really a 
‘new person,’ it does not make sense to show mercy to him (or punish him) for something 
that someone else did. Remorse may well be a justifiable ground for mercy and it is worth 
exploring how it might work.  I flag this project for another day because I want to focus on 
the next potential ground for mercy.    
Tasioulas proposes that an offender’s personal history can serve as ground for mercy.  
He suggests that “grinding poverty, severe emotional deprivation, physical abuse and other 
such evils” in an offender’s life intuitively call for leniency.  These factors, however, do not 
suggest that less punishment is in fact deserved; the factors do not necessarily diminish the 
offender’s culpability or his status as a moral agent responsible for his actions.  The presence 
of such evils in the offender’s life recommend giving him less than he actually deserves.  
These factors play the right structural role to be paradigmatic grounds for mercy.  The 
pressing question, however, is how and why such evils in the offender’s life serve as reasons 
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for leniency without revising down the level of punishment deserved.  Several options 
present themselves.  I will briefly list a few options and focus on the last one.   
One might think that such evils make it the case that the offender is not responsible 
for her character.  She could not help becoming the kind of person she is due to the presence 
of such evils in her life.  Her crime sprung directly from her character and since she is not 
responsible for her character she is not responsible for her crime.  This option fails for two 
reasons, the second of which is more fundamental.  First, this option invites us to revise 
down the level of punishment that is deserved rather than calling for less punishment than 
deserved.  If the offender is not responsible for her character or her crime, then she is not 
culpable and she does not deserve punishment.   We have not introduced ground for giving 
her less than she deserves, we have grounds for judging that she deserves little or no 
punishment.  The option points to grounds for equity, not mercy.  Second, the argument that 
the offender is not responsible for her character should work in principle for any offender, 
not just for offenders who have suffered physical abuse or grinding poverty.  Desert cannot 
be based on responsibility for character ‘all the way down’ lest it become altogether 
inapplicable.  This consideration suggests that this option does not even give solid grounds 
for equity.  Clearly, we must look for another option if we think the presence of evil in the 
offender’s life is a grounds for mercy.     
In some cases, the evil that an offender experiences is due to the fact that she is a 
member of a group that is systematically oppressed in an unjust society.  If so, the state’s 
authority to punish the offender may be undermined.  This consideration suggests that it 
would not be just to punish the offender.  We should give the offender less than he deserves, 
in fact nothing at all, but not out of an attitude of leniency toward him.  We have solid 
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grounds for something like a pardon for reasons of state, except here it is for reasons of the 
lack of a just state.  We do not have grounds for mercy.   
Perhaps the most natural way to explain how the presence of evil in an offender’s life 
serves as grounds for mercy is to appeal to human sympathy.  Indeed the Latin word for 
mercy, misericordia, comes from one’s heart being miserable at the distress of another.  
Tasioulas suggests that “a humanitarian sentiment of ‘There but for the grace of God go I’ 
may demand that these obstacles to good character be taken into account by tempering the 
strict requirements of retributive justice.”12 The thought echoes Martha Nussbaum’s 
understanding of mercy.13  According to Nussbaum, who is highly influenced by Seneca’s 
De Clementia, the merciful judge looks at each case in its full complexity as part of a human 
narrative in a world of obstacles.  The merciful judge sees all the obstacles that the offender 
faces.  She imagines what it is like to be the particular offender, taking what Nussbaum 
describes as a “sympathetic participatory attitude.”  Nussbaum bets that when one honestly 
does these two things—pays attention to all obstacles and imagines being the offender—one 
will cease to have a strict retributive attitude toward the offender.14  One will assign a 
punishment not on the basis of giving the offender what is exactly proportionate to her 
offense, but on the basis of improving the life of the offender.15   
                                                 
 
12 Ibid, 116. 
 
13 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Equity and Mercy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993):  83-125. 
 
14 A number of cases in practice do not support Nussbaum’s claim.  Often hearing the full details of a case leads 
juries to pass down harsher verdicts because they are emotionally swayed by particular details of the crime and 
the impact it has on the victims.  See Mary Sigler, “The Story of Justice:  Retribution, Mercy, and the Role of 
Emotions in the Capital Sentencing Process,” Law and Philosophy 19 (2000):  339-367.  Also see Alicke, M.D., 
Davis, T.L., and Pezzo, M.V., “A posteriori adjustment of a priori decision criteria,” Social Cognition 12 
(1994):  281-308 and Alicke, M.D., “Culpable control and the psychology of blame,” Psychological Bulletin 
126 (2000):  556-574.  
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Nussbaum’s account is extremely attractive, but it leaves open important normative 
questions.  She has described what she thinks judges will be inclined to do when they look at 
offenders with the sympathetic participatory attitude she has advocated, but she has not 
explained why judges should look at cases with that attitude or why they should follow 
through with less than proportionate punishments.  If I were to wear rose colored glasses, I 
would be inclined to go outside and play when it is cloudy and rainy.  But why should I wear 
those glasses?  And even if I should wear them, why should I play outside when it is raining?  
I might catch cold.    
There are two issues here.  First, why should judges adopt the sympathetic 
participatory attitude when looking at a case?  Second, even if judges should look with 
sympathetic eyes, it does not immediately follow that they should pass down sentences 
determined under that sympathetic perspective.  Maybe there are reasons to look in a 
sympathetic light and then pass down a harsh sentence, knowing that it is harsh.  Why should 
the judge pass down a sympathetic sentence rather than a duly proportionate one?  Nussbaum 
lays out Seneca’s mercy tradition and contrasts it to the retribution tradition.  She bets that 
we’ll side with Seneca, but she doesn’t present a case for why we should side with Seneca.   
Like most writers in the philosophical literature on mercy, Nussbaum (as well as 
Tasioulas, Seneca, and others16) take it as “axiomatic” that mercy is a virtue; that one should 
be merciful when the opportunity arises.  They work to show that mercy does not undermine 
justice and thus mercy is permissible.  But they stop short of saying why we should be 
                                                                                                                                                       
15 Aquinas’s understanding of mercy is quite similar.  For Aquinas, mercy is compassion for the offender which 
prompts us to do what we can to help him (Summa Theologica, Question 30).  Jean Hampton follows a similar 
line in Forgiveness and Mercy. 
 
16 Daniel Statman is an exception to this trend.  He pushes on the question, “Why is mercy morally good?” in 
“Doing Without Mercy,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1994):  331-354.  George Rainbolt attempts 
to respond in “Mercy:  In defense of caprice,” Noûs 31 (1997):  226-241.  He defends the disposition to show 
mercy, but does not attempt to defend the act of mercy in a courtroom.  
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merciful.   They suggest that we should be sympathetic and thus merciful but this just pushes 
the question back.  Why should we be sympathetic?  It is exactly here where critics of mercy 
dig in their heels.  Although admittedly permissible, why is it good to give less than a just 
retributive punishment simply because you feel bad for the offender?  At best it looks soft 
and sanctimonious, at worst it looks like a serious abuse of power that would be repugnant to 
an egalitarian.  As Nietzsche so scathingly points out, sympathy may ultimately be about 
looking down on the offender from a position of superiority.  In her grandeur, the 
sympathetic person graces the offender with her pity, seeing her as inferior rather than taking 
her seriously as an equal.  The offender is disregarded as a pest which is not even worthy of 
the sole of one’s shoe.  Nietzsche thinks we ought to unabashedly applaud such behavior, but 
an egalitarian should be appalled by it.  If this is mercy, it violates our commitment to 
meeting one another as equals.     
Moreover, one might be skeptical about the appropriateness of sympathy-driven 
mercy in the law because it invites vicious arbitrariness in practice.  Whether and how much 
sympathy a judge or jury-member feels and consequently how much mercy she shows, may 
depend on her mood, the order in which she hears the case, or the extent to which she 
identifies with the offender based on morally irrelevant factors like gender, race, and 
demeanor.17  These concerns are obviously not unique to the domain of sympathy and mercy, 
they permeate the legal system.  They are diminishable but not inescapable wherever human 
judgment must be applied.  The problem here, however, is that we know that sympathy-
                                                 
 
17 A great deal of empirical work has been done to determine the myriad of factors that influence sentencing 
decisions.  I cannot canvas this literature here, but I point the reader to an article that lists good references on 
the topic.  Bryan Myers, Steven Jay Lynn, Jack Arbuthnot, “Victim Impact Testimony and Juror Judgments: 
The Effects of Harm Information and Witness Demeanor,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 32 (2002), 
2393–2412. 
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driven mercy is particularly susceptible to these concerns and we also know that we can 
function perfectly well without sympathy-driven mercy.  If we have no argument that we 
should be sympathetic and merciful, and we know that doing so would invite additional 
arbitrariness into the law, we can do without it.   
 
IV.  Locating grounds for mercy 
Up to this point, I have suggested that Tasioulas’ account of mercy is promising 
insofar as it dissipates the initial conflict between mercy and justice, but problematic insofar 
as it struggles to fully articulate grounds for mercy.  At first pass he shows that mercy is 
possible and permissible to practice alongside justice, but on a closer look mercy is not 
positively advisable.  Tasioulas has articulated a mercy that does not compromise justice but 
is nevertheless a compromising mercy, one that we can easily do without.  Under the gaze of 
a cynical egalitarian or a practically-minded jurist, it is even a mercy we ought to do without.  
In this section, I aim to articulate strong grounds for mercy.  In so doing I hope to make room 
for an uncompromising mercy, a mercy that is not only permissible, but positively advisable.  
A mercy we ought not do without.    
I pick up where Tasioulas’ analysis seems to run dry.  He suggests that the presence 
of certain evils in an offender’s life is grounds for giving the offender less punishment than 
she deserves.  It is unclear, however, how or why those evils serve as grounds for mercy 
unless we appeal to sympathy which leads us to a compromising mercy.  I will argue that the 
presence of certain kinds of evil in an offender’s life make it the case that the state stands in a 
relation of liability toward the offender.  (To simplify the argument, I will initially consider 
only one sort of evil, horrific child abuse.  In Part V, I will extend the argument to cover 
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other sorts of evil that an offender may have experienced.)  Given this relation of liability 
toward the offender, it would be inappropriate for the state to give the offender exactly what 
he deserves.  Instead, the state should (not just could!) show the offender mercy.    
The argument will take several detours en route to its aim.  Below is a rough roadmap 
of the argument to help the reader keep track of the argument’s basic path.          
Section A:  The appropriateness of a response to wrongdoing depends on the relation 
between the respondent and the offender.  Appropriateness can be 
evaluated narrowly and broadly.   
Section B:  If a respondent stands in a relation of liability toward the offender, it is 
narrowly inappropriate to give the offender exactly what he deserves.  
Instead, the narrowly appropriate response should be moderated by 
concern for the offender.     
Section C:  The state stands in a relation of liability toward victims of child abuse.  
Section D:  The state’s narrowly appropriate response given a relation of liability is 
mercy. 
Section E:  The state’s broadly appropriate response toward abused offenders is 
generally mercy.  
 
Section A:  Relations and appropriate responses to wrongdoing 
 The argument begins with a short detour into the realm of moral accountability.  
Christopher Kutz18 argues that accountability consists in a warrant for certain types of 
interpersonal responses.  A response is warranted when it is appropriate according to 
                                                 
 
18 Complicity:  Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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governing social or moral norms.  A person is accountable for a harm when others are 
warranted in responding to her in ways that are determined by governing norms.  The content 
of the concept of accountability comes from our practice of holding one another accountable 
and the norms which govern that practice.  Kutz’s strategy roughly follows Peter Strawson’s 
move to focus on the practice of how we hold each other responsible rather than on 
metaphysical features about our actions or our will.  Strawson leaves open the question of 
which reactive attitudes count as appropriate – how much we should resent, when is it 
appropriate to forgive, etc.  Kutz suggests that this question is filled in by an appeal to social 
and moral norms.     
We can call one of those norms the retributive norm.  According to the retributivist 
norm, the appropriate response to a wrongdoer is to give him what he deserves, his ‘just 
deserts.’  The degree and kind of blame is determined by some function of the quality of the 
agent’s will and the degree of harm or insult caused.19 Kutz aptly points out that the 
retributive norm is not the sole determinant of the appropriateness of our responses.  In 
practice we generally think responses to wrongdoers should vary based on the relationship 
between the wrongdoer and the respondent.  If Bob does something wrong, the appropriate 
response from a stranger is different from an appropriate response from Bob’s family 
members which is also different from an appropriate response from Bob’s colleagues, or 
Bob’s victim, or the state in which Bob lives.    
At least three theoretical constructs can explain why the appropriateness of the 
response depends on the relationship between Bob and the respondent.  Option One:  What 
Bob deserves from each respondent varies because the relationship between Bob and the 
                                                 
 
19 I am not attributing this view to any retributivist in particular.  I am simply articulating a norm in conceptual 
space and calling it retributivist because it shares some key features with retributive theories of punishment. 
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respondent is different.  On this view, just deserts are relational and cannot be determined 
exclusively by an appeal to the quality of the agent’s will and the degree of harm caused.  
Just deserts are instead determined by society’s norms about what an appropriate response is 
and it turns out that different norms apply to different relations.  Kutz vaguely endorses this 
option, but I do not follow him in this regard.  We do have some notion of desert as a 
function of the quality of the offender’s will and the degree of harm caused.  We could reject 
this notion, but then we would jeopardize the basic retributive framework in which mercy 
resides (at least for the purpose of this paper).   
Option Two:  What Bob deserves from each respondent varies because he has done 
different wrongs to the different parties.  He punched his victim, he violated bystanders’ 
sense of security, he disappointed his parents.  He deserves different responses from these 
different people because each person is responding to a different action (or an action 
differently described).  On this option, just deserts are not fundamentally relational, but they 
depend on fine-grained differences in actions.  I do not think this option holds because a 
bystander can appropriately hold Bob accountable for punching the victim, not just for 
violating her own sense of security.   
Option Three:  Bob deserves the same thing from each respondent, but the 
appropriate response is different.  In some relationships, it is more or less appropriate to 
apply the retributive norm and give the offender what he deserves.  The just deserts do not 
change with different relationships, but the appropriateness of giving those just deserts 
changes with different relationships.  Some should comfort Bob, some should educate Bob, 
some should give Bob what he deserves – what one should do is a matter of the relation 
which one stands in with respect to Bob.  The retributive norm is not the only norm which 
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governs the appropriateness of our responses to wrongdoers.  The retributive norm is salient 
in the context of some relationships, but is not salient in the context of other relationships.  In 
some contexts it is not appropriate to only be concerned with giving what is deserved. 
The relationship between the offender and the respondent determines how salient the 
retributive norm is in determining the appropriateness of the response.  Some relationships 
highlight the salience of norms other than the retributive norm.  To determine what an 
appropriate response is, we need to look not just at features of the offender and her offense, 
but at different kinds of relationships, the corresponding norms they make salient, and the 
corresponding responses that are appropriate with respect to them.  Note that this highly 
contextual account does not imply that responses depend entirely upon the preferences of 
individual respondent.  There are standards governing appropriate response and those 
standards depend upon the structure of relationships between respondents and agents.   
 Up to this point, we have seen appropriate response to an offender vary from person 
A to person B because the relationship between person A and the offender may be different 
from the relationship between person B and the offender.  An example illustrates, however, 
that the appropriateness of a single individual’s response to an offender can vary because one 
individual can stand in various relations toward the offender.   
Consider the cuckolded Karenin responding to his wife’s adultery throughout the 
course of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina.  Responding to Anna as an important public official 
serving as an example of stability in a wobbling society, discretion is appropriate.  
Responding to Anna as a fellow socialite concerned with saving face in social circles, a duel 
and a divorce are called for (here the retributive norm seems most salient).  Responding as a 
self-righteous Christian toiling for moral perfection, forgiveness is essential.  Responding to 
 20
Anna as loving husband is what’s missing here.  The problem with Karenin’s response to 
Anna’s adultery (to the extent that we do find fault with his response) is not that any of his 
responses are inappropriate given the position they are coming from.  We cannot find fault 
with his response qua public official, qua socialite, or qua Christian.   The problem is that he 
is not responding from the position we hoped he would. None of his anger, disappointment, 
or forgiveness springs from his relation to Anna as a betrayed husband.  Instead it comes 
from his relation toward her as inconvenienced official, cuckolded socialite, and saint under 
siege.  We may or may not blame him for this failure to respond as a husband, but we are 
nevertheless disappointed with his response.   
I mention the example not to defend a view about the Karenins or about the 
appropriateness of responses to adultery, but to illustrate a point about the structure of our 
judgments of appropriate response.  The case illustrates that we have two ways of evaluating 
the appropriateness of a response to wrongdoing.  We evaluate appropriateness narrowly-
construed and broadly-construed.  When we evaluate appropriateness narrowly construed, we 
judge whether the response is appropriate given the relation between the offender and the 
respondent.  In this sense, we can say Karenin’s initial response of discretion is appropriate 
qua his relation to Anna as public official to citizen.  When we evaluate appropriateness 
broadly construed, we judge whether the relation from which the response is coming is the 
appropriate relation, all things considered.  In this sense, we say Karenin’s initial response of 
discretion is not appropriate because he ought to be responding from his relation to Anna as 
loving husband rather than public official.  Narrow appropriateness is about whether a 
response aligns with the norms that are salient given a specified relation.  Broad 
appropriateness is about specifying the relation from which the responder ought to be 
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responding from.  As the example of Karenin illustrates, a response can be narrowly 
appropriate but broadly inappropriate.  The response can be narrowly appropriate insofar as it 
is the proper response given a particular relation, but broadly inappropriate insofar as it is not 
the appropriate relation from which to respond.    
Some of the most difficult dilemmas we face in our lives revolve around the difficulty 
of determining what is broadly appropriate.  “From which relation should I respond?” can be 
an extraordinarily difficult question.  For example, consider Melville’s depiction of Captain 
Vere in Billy Budd.  Captain Vere must judge Billy who is falsely accused by the evil 
Claggart of conspiring to mutiny.  Kutz aptly describes Captain Vere’s dilemma: 
“As a representative of naval authority, Vere regards Billy’s assault on Claggart as a 
capital offense…liable to immediate punishment.  As a fellow sailor (and fellow 
Christian), Vere regards Billy’s act as provoked and at least excusable, if not justified 
as well…No wonder Vere seems feverish in his deliberations as he paces his cabin, 
caught amid so many positions.”20   
The term ‘relation’ has been very vague throughout this discussion.  I have been 
using the term loosely.  I referred to various relationships that we recognize between Karenin 
and Anna:  public official and citizen, fellow socialites, fellow Christians, husband and wife.  
Between Vere and Billy we recognize the relationship of captain to crew member and of 
fellow sailor.  We can define a relation as a connection between people that comes with a set 
of norms as to how parties ought to treat and react to each other in various situations.  Broad 
appropriateness is a question of which relation and corresponding set of norms one should 
respond from.  Narrow appropriateness is a further question of what the norms require.  For 
                                                 
 
20 Kutz, 33-35. 
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Captain Vere the first question is torturously difficult and the second is rather simple.  For a 
husband who is more ideal than Karenin, the first question may be quite easy (he should 
respond as husband, not as official or socialite), but the second question may be very 
challenging.  Foreshadowing the remainder of the paper:  we are grappling with the first 
question when we are considering whether or not to show mercy, we are grappling with the 
second question when we are considering what shape that mercy should take (years off a 
sentence, better rehabilitation, total lift of punishment, etc) or if we chose not to be merciful, 
what shape full punishment should take.         
  
 
Section B:  The relation of liability  
 I hope to have shown that the appropriateness of a response to wrongdoing depends 
on the relation between the respondent and the offender.  In this section, I call attention to a 
specific kind of relation that can hold between the respondent and offender:  a relation of 
liability.  The section begins with a thought experiment which illustrates that we intuitively 
recognize the relation of liability and the corresponding response of leniency.  After 
considering the thought experiment, I turn to further demonstration and specification of the 
relation of liability.  I then argue that a relation of liability toward an offender calls for a 
lenient response.     
The Intuitive Case: 
Ivan, Theodore, Gregory, and Alex all share a house.  They divide the chores amongst 
themselves – Ivan takes care of the windows, Theodore takes care of the floors, Gregory 
takes care of the kitchen, and Alex takes care of the bathrooms.  They expect one another to 
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do their chores well enough so that everyone’s basic needs are met.  They are good friends 
and are all rather laconic so they trust one another’s judgment and do not discuss details 
about the chores.  Ivan notices that there are a couple small holes in the screens on the 
windows.  He knows that the group does not have sufficient funds to buy replacement 
screens and he also knows that it is a very hot summer and they will be too warm if they 
close the windows.  So he leaves the windows open despite the holes in the screens.  One 
afternoon a black widow spider crawls in through a hole in the screen and bites Theodore.  
The bite is not lethal, but Theodore is laid up in bed for a few days in extraordinary pain.    
No one thinks Ivan is at fault.  He did not fix the screens, but he did nothing wrong in 
either his action or inaction; he used good judgment, took a smart risk, and it unfortunately 
backfired.  It is not the case that he should have done anything differently than he did. 
Despite the fact that Ivan is not at fault, the incident has altered the normative relation 
between Ivan and Theodore.  Although Ivan, Gregory and Alex all ought to be responsive to 
Theodore’s suffering (expressing concern, perhaps offering to get some ice to reduce the 
pain), we think the “ought” here is stronger for Ivan than the others.  If they all utterly ignore 
Theodore’s suffering, we think we should shake our finger at Ivan before Gregory or Alex.  
A lot of us think Ivan should say something along the lines of “I’m sorry” to Theodore.21  No 
one thinks Gregory or Alex should do likewise.  If Theodore were to die from the bite, we 
think Ivan should feel pangs of what Bernard Williams called agent-regret in a way which 
Gregory and Alex should not.  If Theodore calls in sick to work the next day complaining of 
pain from the bite, Gregory and Alex might tell him to “just suck it up,” but that kind of 
criticism seems less appropriate from Ivan’s mouth.   
                                                 
 
21 Note that saying something along the lines of “I’m sorry” is not equivalent to apologizing.  An apology is 
generally appropriate only when a relation of fault is in play.   
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Limits are in play here.  Ivan should not stand by and let Theodore use the bite as an 
excuse for everything.  Ivan is under no obligation to stay by Theodore’s bedside for days.  
Although it might be nice for Ivan to say “I’m sorry,” he certainly does not have to do so.  
Even if the bite were lethal, one would likely tell Ivan not to feel so bad.  After all, it was an 
accident and there was nothing he could do, he wasn’t at fault.  But even though he is not at 
fault, not responsible, not blameworthy, that is not the end of the story.  If Ivan does nothing, 
says nothing, feels nothing we would think something is amiss.  He should at least do or say 
something.  The others should do or say something as well, but for Ivan the “should” is a bit 
stronger and the appropriate actions or words are relatively more involved. The others should 
have concern for Theodore, but Ivan should have special concern.  Exactly what is involved 
in this special concern is not clear, but we know it is special in comparison to the others’ 
response.  The point is that the norms governing Ivan’s response to Theodore are different 
than those governing Alex and Gregory’s response.  It makes little difference whether we say 
the change is due to a change in the relation or a change in the applicable norms.  Given our 
definition of relation, they can mean the same thing.  For simplicity, I shall say different 
relation.  After the bite, Ivan stands in a relation of liability toward Theodore and the others 
do not.22     
Let us investigate what the relation of liability involves if we change the situation a 
bit.  Suppose that when Theodore is in bed recovering from the sting he becomes very 
grouchy and starts hurling vicious insults at Gregory on a regular basis.  Just as Ivan is not at 
                                                 
 
22 The intuitive point here is that our responsibilities to one another are not solely determined by considering 
what is and what is not our “fault.”  Susan Wolf highlights a similar point in her discussion of moral luck.  She 
writes, “to draw sharp lines between what one is responsible for and what is up to the rest of the world, to try in 
this way to extricate oneself and others from the messiness and the irrational contingencies of the world, would 
be to remove oneself from the only ground on which it is possible for beings like ourselves to meet.” “The 
Moral of Moral Luck” in Setting the Moral Compass, ed. Cheshire Calhoun (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2004), p. 123. 
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fault for Theodore’s sting, Ivan is not at fault for the fact that Gregory is being insulted.  
Intuitively, however, it seems that Ivan should have a more moderate or lenient attitude 
toward Theodore than Alex and Gregory.  Although the insults may lead Gregory and Alex 
to be justifiably indignant and perhaps break ties of friendship with Theodore, it would seem 
unfair, or at least significantly harsher, for Ivan to leave Theodore in the dust.  To do so 
would be to fail to recognize his own liability and the role he played in the situation.  It may 
be appropriate for the others to give Theodore exactly what he deserves, but it would be 
inappropriate for Ivan to do likewise.  Ivan’s response should be moderated by the relation of 
liability he bears toward Theodore.  Ivan still owes Theodore special concern.  Ivan could 
appropriately criticize Theodore for his poor behavior, but the criticism should be guided by 
the aim of improving Theodore, not by a resolve that he get his just deserts.      
We can see the relation of liability and the corresponding response of leniency at 
work in our daily lives, not just when housemates fail to fix screens.  Suppose you give 
someone advice that everyone would agree is good advice, but it severely backfires for the 
advisee and she does something wrong (or at least something unfortunate or misguided).  For 
example, you advise a friend to date someone and the relationship turns very sour from both 
ends.  Or you advise a daughter to attend a particular university and she flunks out because 
the school turns out to be an awful fit.  Or perhaps you buy a colleague a drink not knowing 
she is a recovering alcoholic and she falls off the wagon.  Most of us recognize that the range 
of appropriate ways for you to respond to the advisee’s misguided actions is different from 
the range of appropriate ways others could respond.  Your normative relation is marked by 
your liability.  It would be inappropriate for you to insist on giving the advisee exactly what 
she deserves (to the extent that she deserves anything in these cases).  To do so would be 
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unduly harsh; instead you should moderate your response with genuine concern for the 
advisee.       
A Closer Look: 
I hope to have demonstrated the intuitive force behind recognizing a relation of 
liability and its corresponding response of leniency.  With this intuitive force established, let 
us take a closer look at the relation of liability.  Under what conditions does the relation of 
liability arise? 
The relation of liability has its roots in a recognition of the pervasiveness of obstacles 
and accidents in human life, of the undeniable fact that things all-too-often go wrong in this 
world.   Given this starting point, it is unsurprising that a Stoic was the first and perhaps the 
most insistent defender of mercy.  After we admit that life is characterized by accidents and 
obstacles, we must consider how to cope with such difficulties. When unfortunate events 
happen, we should not expect individual victims to bear the heavy burden of such events 
entirely on their own.  Instead we recognize that we ought to take care of one another.  
Certain norms, one might call them norms of responsibility for one another, guide how we 
ought to do so.  If someone has caused the unfortunate event through some wrongdoing, she 
is primarily responsible for cleaning up the mess that she leaves in her wake (she ought to 
“make amends”).  Often, however, there is no offender or the offender lacks the resources to 
make amends.  In these cases, it is not entirely clear what is to be done.  Should the 
community-at-large, including those utterly disconnected from the situation, take on the 
responsibility for cleaning up the mess?  Should a group of people who bear some relevant 
relation to the victim shoulder the responsibility?  Should the victim just tough it out on her 
own in some cases? 
 27
Tort theory sheds some light on these questions.23  Tort law establishes conditions 
under which victims of various sorts of accidents can shift some of their costs onto other 
parties.  Generally, a victim can claim some compensation from a defendant if she has 
suffered some harm that was proximately caused by a wrong committed by the defendant.  
The tort claim can take two forms:  fault liability and strict liability.  The difference between 
fault and strict liability is thought to be rooted in a difference between underlying duties of 
care.  We recognize various duties of care toward one another.  Breach of theses duties gives 
rise to liability, but whether it is strict or fault liability depends on the content of the duty.  To 
illustrate the difference, compare the following two activities:  dynamite blasting and driving. 
We recognize a duty not to harm anyone by dynamite blasting.  We do not recognize a duty 
not to harm anyone by driving.  We do, however, recognize a duty not to harm anyone by 
faultily driving.  The blaster breaches her duty if she harms anyone no matter how much care 
she takes.  The driver breaches her duty only if she negligently, recklessly, or intentionally 
harms someone through her driving.  The blaster will be subject to strict liability for any 
blasting accident and the driver will be subject to fault liability for any accident she causes 
through her own fault.   
The general point illuminated by tort theory is that when things fall apart, duties of 
care govern who is responsible for picking up which pieces.  Often the contents of duties of 
care are such that one can be responsible for ‘picking up the pieces’ regardless of whether 
one is technically at fault or not.  For example, Ivan has a duty of care to prevent his 
housemate’s from being inconvenienced by anything concerning the house’s windows.  Ivan 
                                                 
 
23 This paragraph draws heavily on Jules Coleman’s entry in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
“Theories of Tort Law,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2007 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.).  Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/tort-theories/. 
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can stand in breach of this duty through no fault of his own.  He innocently failed to prevent 
Theodore from being inconvenienced by problems with the windows.  Given that Ivan stands 
in breach of his duty of care to Theodore, he bears a relation of liability toward Theodore.  
As we recognized, Ivan ought to show special concern toward Theodore with respect to 
affairs that are causally tied to the spider bite.  Ivan should offer to help alleviate Theodore’s 
pain and perhaps say “I’m sorry,” but he need not bail Theodore out of a debt that he 
incurred before the spider bit.  Ivan is also not obligated to show special concern toward 
Theodore in regard to unconnected misfortunes which may befall him years later.    
Duties of care should not be confused with full-stop duties in the Kantian sense.  To 
have a duty of care does not entail that it is always possible for one to meet that duty (indeed 
it is impossible for Ivan to absolutely ensure that no one is ever inconvenienced by the 
windows), nor does it entail that one is morally obligated to fulfill that duty at any and all 
expense.  If one fails to fulfill a duty of care, one is not necessarily morally blameworthy 
(one is only blameworthy if one’s failure is a result of maliciousness, recklessness, or 
negligence).  If one fails to fulfill a duty of care, however, one does stand in a relation of 
liability toward the failed party.  One ought to show special concern toward the failed party 
with respect to the proximate effects of the breach of duty.  Although one is not necessarily 
blameworthy for failing to fulfill duties of care, one is blameworthy for second-order failure 
– for failing to show appropriate concern to the failed party.  We do not fault Ivan for the 
spider bite, but we do fault Ivan if he does nothing for Theodore in response to the bite.    
To summarize:  If x has a duty of care to protect y from some unfortunate event E, 
then x should try to prevent E from befalling y.  If E nevertheless befalls y (through the fault 
of x or through no fault of x), then x stands in a relation of liability toward y.  X is 
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accordingly obligated to show special concern toward y in regard to affairs that are causally 
tied to E.  The form and extent of the concern depend on the context of the situation.  The 
phrase “causally tied” is admittedly rather vague.  To say one event is causally tied to another 
is not to say that the latter event is necessarily the cause of the former.  What I am calling a 
causal tie is much weaker.  To say one event is causally tied to another is simply to say that 
the latter is causally significant to the former.  What counts as significant will be highly 
context sensitive.    
I have drawn attention to the structural role that duties of care play in giving rise to 
relations of liability.  To see when relations of liability actually hold, we need to discern the 
contents of the relevant duties of care we owe to one another.  Who has which duties of care?  
The answer depends on the context of the situation, in the next section we return to the 
context in which we were initially working, the context of the state and an abused offender.        
Before moving on, however, we should take a closer look at what the narrowly 
appropriate response is to an offender given a relation of liability.  As observed in the case of 
Ivan and the advisees, the relation of liability seems to command a moderate or lenient 
response when the failed party commits an offense that is causally tied to the respondent’s 
breach of duty of care.  Why does the relation of liability command a more moderate or 
lenient response?  As we have established, the relation of liability commands special concern 
toward the failed party in regard to affairs causally tied to the breach of duty.  If the failed 
party does something wrong (and the wrong is casually tied to the breach of duty), the special 
concern should not simply vanish.  The shape that the concern takes, however, is certainly 
affected by the context of the situation.  The liable respondent may admonish the offender – 
the offender did do something wrong and the respondent should not deny this, condone this, 
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or ‘look past’ it, especially when the wrong is very grave.   The response must nevertheless 
be guided by the special concern which the respondent owes to the offender in virtue of the 
relation of liability in which she stands.  The respondent should accordingly treat the 
offender not with the aim of making her suffer in proportion to her offense, but with an eye 
of concern toward her.  This treatment may well include harsh criticism, but if the criticism is 
appropriate, it must be forward-looking and given for the sake of the offender.  The narrowly 
appropriate response given a relation of liability need not be “soft,” but it should be marked 
by special concern for the offender.  Generally this means that the response will be less 
severe than it would be if a relation of liability were not in place.    
 
Section C:  The state’s relation of liability toward victims of child abuse 
In this section I argue that the state has a duty of care to protect children from abuse.  
The state thus stands in a relation of liability toward all victims of child abuse.  In the next 
section I will argue that given this relation, the state ought to respond leniently to offenders 
who have been abused.   
The state certainly does not have a duty of care to prevent everyone’s interests from 
ever being disturbed.  The state does have a duty of care, however, to prevent everyone’s 
basic rights from being violated.  Part of what it is to have a right is to demand that the state 
try to protect it from being violated and to show some ‘special concern’ in the event that it is 
violated.  It seems safe to assume that children have a right not to be abused.  The state 
accordingly has a duty of care to protect children from abuse and stands in a relation of 
liability toward victims of child abuse.  I see no reason to suppose that duties of care and 
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corresponding relations of liability would hold only between individual parties and not 
between the state and individuals.   
Note that the number of ways in which the state can incur a relation of liability 
toward a citizen depends on the number of duties of care which the state can be said to bear 
toward its citizens.  The state’s duties of care in turn depend on what rights citizens have and 
this depends on a larger theory of justice which I cannot hope to defend within the scope of 
this paper.  It appears uncontroversial from the perspective of a wide range of theories of 
justice that a child has a right to not be abused.  People also seem to have a right to safety in 
their own homes, to very basic necessities, and to an opportunity to earn a living wage, but 
exploring this area in detail is a project for another day.       
It is worth mentioning that in many cases, the state does not merely stand in a relation 
of liability toward victims of child abuse.  The state also stands in a relation of fault toward 
many victims of child abuse.  The state is at fault when it actively contributes to the abuse or 
when it could have and should have prevented the abuse.  The state is at fault if one of its 
representatives, such as a foster parent or an employee at a juvenile detention center, abuses 
the child.  The state can also be at fault for negligence in preventing the abuse.  For example, 
the state is at fault if a state-employed social worker notices that a child is being abused, has 
the resources to help the child, and fails to help the child.  The state is also at fault if a child 
attends public school with obvious signs of abuse and her teachers either fail to notice or fail 
to act.  In these cases and many others, the state could have and should have done something 
to protect the child’s right to not be physically abused.   
Although the state may be in a relation of fault toward many victims of child abuse, 
the state does not bear this relation toward all victims of child abuse.  The state is not at fault 
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if the child abuse is very well hidden and no relevant party would have had good reason to 
suspect abuse.  In these cases and others, it is not the case that the state should have done 
anything differently all things considered.  The state may have been able to stop the abuse if 
it kept close tabs on every family’s private life, but the state justifiably refrains from doing so 
due to respect for privacy.  In these sorts of cases, the state is not at fault – that is to say, 
there is nothing the state should have done differently, the state is not blameworthy.24 Even if 
the state does not stand in a relation of fault toward victims of child abuse, the state 
nevertheless stands in a relation of liability toward these victims.  I have chosen to focus on 
what follows from a relation of liability rather than what follows from a relation of fault 
because the former is the broader category – all relations of fault are relations of liability, but 
not all relations of liability are relations of fault. 
 
Section D: The state’s narrowly appropriate response toward abused offenders 
I hope to have shown that the state stands in a relation of liability toward all victims 
of child abuse.  What is the narrowly appropriate response to an abused offender given this 
relation of liability?  Applying our work in Section B, the answer may seem obvious.  The 
state ought to be lenient toward offenders whose crimes are causally tied to the abuse they 
suffered as children.  In this section, I will clarify what is meant by ‘causally tied’ in this 
context.  I will also clarify what a ‘lenient response’ is in this context, arguing that it amounts 
to showing mercy.    
                                                 
 
24 Optimists may argue that it is possible for the state to prevent abuse.  If that is the case, then there is 
something the state could have done and should have done to prevent abuse.  Accordingly, the state would stand 
in a relation of fault to all victims of abuse.  I do not think optimists are correct on this point.  If they were, 
however, the case I will make for mercy for abused offenders would be even clearer.  Imagine Ivan had known 
black widows would enter the house and that he could have fixed the screens.  It is even clearer in this case that 
Ivan should be lenient toward Theodore.  Likewise, if the state is at fault for child abuse, it is even clearer that 
the state ought to be lenient toward abused offenders.   
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One might argue that in many cases an abused offender’s crime is not causally tied to 
the abuse he suffered as a child.  The effects of child abuse diminish over time and arguably 
do not significantly contribute to criminal behavior in adults.  If there is no causal tie 
between the crime and the state’s breach of duty of care, then the state does not owe the 
offender any special concern or leniency of the sort discussed here.   A close investigation of 
what counts as a causal connection is required to fully consider this argument.  I leave this 
investigation to future work.  For now, however, I would like to make a prima facie case that 
child abuse is causally significant to violent crime committed by adult offenders who were 
abused as children.  Although it is notoriously difficult to show that child abuse is a cause of 
crime, it is clear that child abuse is significantly linked to crime.  People who suffer child 
abuse and neglect are four times more likely to be arrested as juveniles and twice as likely to 
be arrested as adults than those who have had benign childhoods.25  Although the influence 
of the abuse on crime does seem to diminish as most victims age, the influence certainly does 
not fade to the point of vanishing.  The abuse may become more distant in time without 
becoming any less influential in the life of the victim.  More work clearly needs to be done 
here.  For now I hope to have shown that crime committed by abused offenders may not be 
caused by, but is causally connected to the abuse they suffered as children.   
I have argued that the state stands in a relation of liability toward victims of child 
abuse.  This relation calls for a lenient response when the victim of abuse commits an offense 
that is causally tied to the abuse she suffered.  But what does a lenient response amount to in 
                                                 
 
25 English, Widom, and Brandford.  “Childhood Victimization and Delinquency, Adult Criminality, and Violent 
Criminal Behavior: A Replication and Extension,” Final Report presented to the National Institute, Grant No. 
97-IJ-CX-0017. Retrieved from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/184894.pdf.  For an excellent review of 
research studies in this area, see Janet Currie and Edal Tekin, “Does Child Abuse Cause Crime?,” Working 
Paper in Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series (2006).  Retrieved from 
http://aysps.gsu.edu/CurrieTekin_ChildAbuse.pdf. 
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this context?  One might think leniency here amounts to showing the offender mercy, i.e. 
giving the offender less than she deserves through an attitude of special concern.  
Alternatively, however, one might think the position of liability calls for prosecuting and 
punishing the offender’s previous abusers and need not entail showing the offender mercy.  
Or perhaps the position of liability calls for the state to give the offender or his children some 
kind of monetary reparations but nonetheless punish the offender to the fullest extent of the 
law.   
A look back at Section B reveals that the relation of liability commands special 
concern.  When people commit wrongs that are tied to our breach of duties of care for them, 
our response toward them must be guided by a concern for their well-being.  To figure out 
the most (narrowly) appropriate response, a judge must consider what would be best for the 
offender given the range of options (the range is constrained by the fact that the offender has 
broken the law – I will discuss this point further below).  The best option may be to choose a 
shorter and/or more comfortable sentence on the range of options.  This option qualifies as 
merciful insofar as the shorter sentence is a less severe punishment than that recommended 
by the retributive norm.   The best option, however, may not involve choosing a short 
sentence.  Given the lives that many offenders return to on the streets of America, often the 
best way to show concern for their well-being is not to cut prison time, but to ensure that the 
prison time improves the offender’s life in the long run.  Due to the current state of affairs, 
this option would involve insisting on serious penal reform.  According to the understanding 
of mercy laid out at the beginning of the paper, this option would also count as showing the 
offender mercy.  This point is consistent with Seneca’s thought that being merciful is a 
matter of acting on a heightened concern for the well-being of the offender.   
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One might wonder whether an appropriate response might be to simply prosecute and 
punish the offender’s abusers but nevertheless give the offender his just deserts.  This 
response would not be appropriate because it is not guided by special concern for the 
offender – punishing his abusers does not contribute to the offender’s own well-being.  One 
might also wonder if it would be appropriate to give monetary reparations to the offender or 
to those he loves (if he cannot use the money in prison), and then give him his just deserts.  
This option is appropriate only if the reparations are given out of a genuine concern for the 
offender’s well-being.  One must judge that the reparations are an effective way to improve 
the offender’s well-being, in this case the response is appropriate and it also qualifies as what 
I have called mercy.  It is unlikely, however, that this response will work in practice.  
Monetary reparations rarely improve the lives of those within the walls of a prison and 
moreover they express that the offender’s abuse can be compensated for in a dollar amount.  
The state may have good reason to avoid making that sort of expression.     
 
Section E:  The state’s broadly appropriate response toward abused offenders 
The above discussion establishes that mercy is the narrowly appropriate response 
given a relation of liability toward abused offenders.  It would be too quick, however, to 
conclude that the state should therefore show mercy to such offenders.  The relation of 
liability is not the only relation which the state stands in with respect to the offender.  The 
state stands in various relations toward the offender:  the stands as upholder of the law, as 
exactor of just deserts, and as protector of the population at large (this list is not necessarily 
exhaustive).  Insofar as conflict exists between the narrowly appropriate responses 
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recommended by these relations, the state must face the question of broad-appropriateness:  
from which relation should the state respond?   
First, let us consider the fact that the state stands in the relation of upholder of the law 
toward the offender.  Fortunately, the appropriate response from this relation does not 
conflict with the narrowly appropriate response from the relation of liability.  Insofar as the 
law outlines a range of punishments for the offender and the judge (or jury) has discretion 
within this range, then from the position of upholder of the law, the state’s appropriate 
response is underdetermined – it is anything within the range determined by the law.  From 
the position of liability, the state’s appropriate response is to choose the option which is best 
for the offender.  This will generally be a lenient option in this range.  The state’s position of 
upholder of the law constrains the options from which it can respond in its position of 
liability, but there need be no incompatibility here.    
A strict retributivist26 will press that the state bears another important relation to the 
offender which does conflict with the relation of liability.  The state is the only entity with 
the authority to give the offender his just deserts.  For short, call this the relation of exactor of 
just deserts.  The narrowly appropriate response given this relation is for the state to give the 
offender exactly what he deserves (of course within the limits of the state’s position as 
upholder of the law).  The narrowly appropriate response here clearly conflicts with the 
narrowly appropriate response from the position of liability.  From one perspective it is 
appropriate to punish the offender less severely than he deserves, from another it is 
                                                 
 
26 Recall that by strict retributivist, I mean someone who thinks the state ought to dole out punishment in accord 
with the retributive norm.  One can endorse what I have referred to as the retributive norm without being a 
retributivist.  Such a person would hold that there is a certain amount of punishment which the offender 
deserves on some function of the quality of his will and the gravity of his crime, but the state should not be in 
the business of giving the offender what he deserves.  The concept of mercy as I defined it presupposes the 
retributive norm but not the strict retributivist position.     
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appropriate to give the offender exactly what he deserves; both responses are within the 
bounds of the law.  We have captured and clarified the conflict that opened this essay, now 
we must make progress on it.  Like Captain Vere, we face a difficult question.  What is the 
broadly appropriate response for the state?  From which relation should it respond to the 
offender?    
I will argue that the state should not respond from a position of exactor of just deserts 
toward abused offenders (and some others).  The argument begins by supposing that the state 
ought to respond from the position of exactor of just deserts toward abused offenders.  This 
supposition leads to an inevitable tension between kinds of justice – the tension renders it 
impossible for the implementation of the law to be fully just.  Assuming that this is a 
conclusion to be avoided, I reject the supposition that the state ought to respond from the 
position of exactor of just deserts toward abused offenders.  The argument will be framed 
with reference to Kant’s discussion of similar issues in the Metaphysics of Morals.  My aim 
in referencing Kant is not to defend an interpretation of his opinion on the issue,27 but rather 
to use his work as a springboard for our own investigation.  He is a helpful foil because he 
appears to endorse the supposition that the state ought to respond from the position of exactor 
of deserts toward abused offenders.28       
Kant recognizes that an appropriate response to an offender varies with the relation in 
which one stands to the offender. 29   He discusses this point in his discussion of the 
                                                 
 
27 For an interpretation of Kant’s view of mercy, see Sarah Holtman, “When Mercy Seasons Justice:  
Reflections on the Character of the Kantian Judge.” 
 
28 Kant’s determination of ‘just deserts,’ is different from what we have been working with.  It does not depend 
on the quality of the agent’s will.  This point is not relevant, however, to the rest of the argument.  
 
29 Kant’s acceptance of the idea that appropriateness changes with relation is further evidenced in his discussion 
of the right to pardon.  He argues that although it is unacceptable for a sovereign to pardon an offender in his 
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appropriate response toward a mother who murders an illegitimate child and a soldier who 
murders someone in a duel.  The appropriate response from society is heavily influenced by 
norms of honor which are not ensconced in law.  If the response to crime is coming from 
society or “the people,” leniency is appropriate.  If the response to crime is coming from the 
state as exactor of just deserts, the death penalty is appropriate.  Kant highlights the 
discrepancy between the two narrowly-appropriate responses:  “the public justice arising 
from the state becomes injustice from the perspective of the justice arising from the 
people.”30  Kant is not entirely clear on how the state should respond given this discrepancy.  
He remarks that in such cases “penal justice finds itself very much in a quandary…it remains 
doubtful whether legislation is authorized to impose the death penalty.”31   
On an admittedly controversial Rousseauvian interpretation of Kant, the appropriate 
response is for the state to respond as representative of the will of the people rather than 
exactor of just deserts.  For if the state does not represent the will of the people, the state 
lacks the authority to use coercive power.  The judge has two options.  Respond from the 
position of state as upholder of the law, determine accordingly that death is appropriate, and 
then not actually punish the offender because she lacks the authority to do so.  Or respond 
from the position of the people, determine that leniency is appropriate, and punish the 
offender leniently.  All things considered, the latter option is preferable.  The idea here is that 
the broadly appropriate response is for the state to respond in the name of the people who 
may be more or less behind leniency or just deserts in any given case.  This argument pushes 
                                                                                                                                                       
relation to the offender as sovereign, it is acceptable for a sovereign to pardon an offender in his relation to the 
offender as a fellow person.  The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:337.  
 
30 The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:337. 
 
31 Ibid., 6:336 
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back the question of broad appropriateness onto the people.  The argument justifies leniency 
for abused offenders if the people are behind it, but it also seems to justify extraordinarily 
harsh punishment for abused offenders if the people are behind it.  This Rousseauvian 
argument is unsatisfying.  The law becomes a hostage to public opinion, inviting in a myriad 
of problems that I am not prepared to solve on behalf of Rousseauvians.   
It is worth considering an alternative response to Kant’s quandary of what is broadly 
appropriate.  On a strict retributivist reading of the text,32 Kant asserts that the state should 
execute the offender because it must act from the position of exactor of just deserts.  Kant 
admits that this course of action is unjust from the perspective of the people whose response 
is influenced by social norms of honor.  In this sense, Kant echoes Thomas More’s comment 
that “until you put these things right, you are not entitled to boast of the justice meted out to 
thieves.”  In Kant’s view one should mete out punishment even if one cannot call it fully just, 
because the state simply ought to respond from its position as exactor of just deserts.  The 
injustice here is not that there is an actual public outcry against the state’s action, but rather 
that there is a discrepancy between the state’s action and what social norms call for when 
properly applied to the situation.  The state’s implementation of the law in theses cases does 
not respect the norms active in the society which it governs.  In this sense, the state’s 
authority to govern that society is not fully justified; the state must act in such cases but it 
must do so without full license.  Its actions are admittedly unjust.  Kant seems to be willing 
to accept such injustice because he believes it is temporary and can be eradicated by social 
                                                 
 
32 “The knot can be undone in the following way:  the categorical imperative of penal justice remains (unlawful 
killing of another must be punished by death), but the legislation itself (and consequently also the civil 
constitution), as long as it remains barbarous and undeveloped, is responsible for the discrepancy between the 
incentives of honor in the people (subjectively) and the measures that are objectively suitable for its purpose.  
So the public justice arising from the state becomes injustice from the perspective of the justice arising from the 
people” (MM 6:337).   
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reform.  Social reform can change the norms of honor such that they no longer motivate 
people to engage in duels or kill babies.  After reform, justice from the perspective of the 
state would align with justice from the perspective of the people and no form of social 
injustice would plague implementation of the law.   
Notice that Kant’s assertion that the state ought to act as exactor of just deserts leads 
him to accept temporary and removable injustice in the implementation of the law.  One 
might be willing to bite this bullet alongside Kant, but I will argue that in some cases the 
bullet is much larger and unpalatable.  If one thinks the state ought to act as exactor of just 
deserts in the case of abused offenders (and others), then one must accept perpetual and 
inevitable injustice in the implementation of the law.   
Just as people in Kant’s society respected certain social norms of honor, people in 
today’s society (and arguably in Kant’s as well) respect certain norms of liability.  If an 
officer was insulted in Kant’s society, social norms of honor required him to fight a duel.  
From a social perspective, it would accordingly be inappropriate to punish the officer.  If we 
breach a duty of care, social norms of liability require us to show special concern toward the 
failed party and be lenient toward her if she does wrong.  From a social perspective, it would 
accordingly be inappropriate to demand that an abused offender suffer in exact proportion to 
his culpability.  Instead, some measure of leniency is appropriate (note that the social 
perspective is not what the people are actually saying, but what the social norms deem 
appropriate).  From the perspective of the state as exactor of just deserts, however, the 
appropriate response is giving the offender his just deserts.  If the state acts as exactor of just 
deserts, its implementation of the law is unjust given the social perspective:  “the public 
justice arising from the state becomes injustice from the perspective of the justice arising 
 41
from the people.”33  Kant suggests that this injustice is not a large problem as long as it is 
temporary and removable by reform.  In the case of abused offenders, however, sufficient 
reform is impossible.  I do not simply mean “impossible” in the sense that reform is 
inevitably slow and unlikely to happen.  I mean that it is impossible given basic facts about 
the world to remove the relevant injustice without introducing new injustice.     
The possibility of child abuse remains as long as society retains families and some 
degree of privacy (which a broad theory of justice requires).  We cannot guarantee that no 
victim of child abuse will become a criminal offender as long as citizens are allowed a 
reasonable degree of freedom (which again justice requires).  No matter how just a state is, it 
is possible, indeed likely given what we know about human nature, for it to have criminals 
who are victims of child abuse.  Social norms of liability maintain that leniency is the 
appropriate response to abused offenders.  Moreover, we do not think social reformers ought 
to eliminate the norms of liability governing this response.  Recall that the norms of liability 
help us together cope with a world marked by accidents and obstacles.  Since we should not 
eliminate the norm and we cannot reform away the incidence of abused criminal offenders, 
we are stuck with the fact that justice from the prospective of the state as exactor of just 
deserts will perpetually be at odds with justice from the perspective of society that takes 
seriously the vicissitudes of life.   
This conflict is problematic.  The implementation of the law in these cases can never 
be fully just.  The state could give the offender exactly what she deserves, but doing so is an 
injustice given the social perspective.  Or the state could give the offender less than she 
deserves, but doing so would be an injustice from the state’s perspective.  Justice is bound to 
                                                 
 
33 Ibid. 
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speak with conflicting voices.  The conflict runs deep; it cannot be relieved by reforming 
society.  Assuming that we want justice to speak with one voice, we need to keep the conflict 
from initially arising.  There are two ways to avoid the conflict.  First, one could argue that 
we were mistaken in supposing that justice from the social perspective calls for leniency.  
Perhaps the broadly appropriate response from the social perspective is not to respond from a 
relation of liability, but rather from some other relation that calls for giving the offender 
exactly what she deserves.  In this case, it would be just from the perspective of both the state 
and society for the offender to be punished with her just deserts.  Second, one could argue 
that we were mistaken in supposing that justice from the state’s perspective entails giving the 
offender exactly what she deserves.  Perhaps the broadly appropriate response from the state 
is not to respond to abused offenders from the position of exactor of just deserts, but rather 
from a position of liability that calls for leniency.  In this case, it would be just from the 
perspective of both the state and society for the offender to receive less than her just deserts.  
Two reasons stand in favor of making the second move rather than the first.  The first 
reason is that the first move is problematic.  Saying that we should not respond from a 
relation of liability when we stand in one is failing to take seriously the duties of care that we 
owe to one another.  Failing in this way commits us to leaving victims of some of life’s worst 
misfortunes to bear the effects of those misfortunes on their own.  Instead of helping them 
out of a recognition that we too could be subject to the same misfortunes (‘there but for the 
grace of God go I’), we say ‘too bad, that is your problem, not mine.’  To not respond from a 
relation of liability when we stand in one is to give up on our commitment to care for one 
another in a world characterized by misfortune.   
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The second reason for choosing the second move rather then the first move is that we 
have already accepted something akin to the second move in a variety of other contexts.  In 
many cases it is clear that it is not broadly appropriate for the state to respond from the 
position of exactor of just deserts.  When there is a very strong state interest not to respond 
from the position of exactor of just deserts, it is appropriate for the state not to respond from 
the position of exactor of just deserts.  Evidence lies in the fact that we think it is appropriate 
for prosecutors to give plea bargains to offenders who testify against mob bosses or drug 
lords and for Ford to have pardoned Nixon.  Such cases illustrate that we are not giving much 
up if we admit that justice from the state’s perspective does not demand responding from the 
relation of exactor of just deserts. 34  We already admit this point in a great deal of cases.  
These two reasons seem to sufficiently support making what I referred to as the 
second move.  That is, we should accept that that justice from the state’s perspective does not 
require the state to give the offender exactly what she deserves.  The broadly appropriate 
response from the state is not to respond to abused offenders from the position of exactor of 
just deserts, but rather from a position of liability that calls for leniency.  In this way, the 
implementation of the law with respect to these cases can be just both from the perspective of 
the state and society.  
The upshot of the argument here is rather surprising.  Making room for mercy in 
criminal justice is the best way for the implementation of the law to be just in every sense.  
We initially suspected that mercy in criminal law compromises justice.  Now we see that 
denying mercy room in the criminal law would compromise justice.  Note that the argument 
has not undermined the retributive norm or suggested that it is internally flawed.  We have 
                                                 
 
34 Kant scholars have argued on various grounds that Kant’s mature jurisprudence is in fact not committed to 
the claim that the state must always serve as exactor of just deserts.   
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instead provided reasons to think that the retributive norm is not the relevant norm 
determining the broadly appropriate response of the state toward abused offenders.  Given 
our non-ideal world, the retributive norm should sometimes take the back seat and give 
mercy the reigns.  
My conclusion is somewhat tentative.  I should note two qualifications.  First, justice 
must make room for mercy only insofar as the society is committed to the norm of liability.  I 
have given some reason to think that society should be so committed, but if it is not then the 
above argument for mercy does not hold.  Second, I have not considered all the various 
relations which the state arguably stands in with respect to the offender.  It is possible that 
one such relation conflicts and arguably trumps the relation of liability.  I cannot think of 
such a relation and I doubt that one exists.  Nevertheless I should temper my conclusion.  
Provided that the state should not respond from some other conflicting relation that I have 
failed to consider, the state ought to respond to abused offenders from the position of liability 
which calls for mercy (within the bounds of the position of upholder of the law).   
 
V.  Objections and responses 
I have argued that if the state responds as exactor of just deserts it does so at the cost 
of inviting inevitable social injustice.  One might argue that the state should nevertheless 
respond as exactor of just deserts on the following grounds.  Sometimes social norms call for 
punishment beyond the retributive norm.  In these cases, we want to say that the state should 
respond as exactor of just deserts – not giving the offender more (or less) than he deserves – 
and we accept the inevitable injustice which this break with social norms invites.  Justice 
from the perspective of the state will be unjust from the perspective of society, but we are 
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willing to accept injustice in these cases, even if it is inevitable.  Given that we are willing to 
accept inevitable injustice here, why should inevitable injustice be grounds to change our 
position in other cases?   
In response, one could deny the existence of a social norm on which it is appropriate 
to give an offender more than he deserves.  Generally when people think it is appropriate to 
be very harsh toward an offender it is because they think she deserves this harsh treatment 
because her will was particularly malicious or her act was particularly heinous. A person in a 
mob may assent to the thought that the offender should get more than she deserves, but on 
reflection few think this is appropriate.  History, however, stands in the face of this first 
response.  Some people have thought, indeed some continue to think, that it is appropriate for 
racial minorities to get more punishment than they deserve.  We need an alternative response.   
Even if there is a social norm on which it is appropriate to give the offender more 
than he deserves, we can affirm that it is possible to reform society such that people will no 
longer think it is appropriate to give any offender more than he deserves (perhaps less, but 
never more).  In the case of abused offenders, however, the reform option is not available and 
we are forced to conclude that the state should not respond as exactor of just deserts lest we 
surrender to perpetual injustice. It seems suspicious and ad hoc to argue that it impossible to 
solve the problem raised by child abuse, but nevertheless possible to solve the problem raised 
by racial bias.  To solve the problem of child abuse we would have to either a) sacrifice a 
measure of justice to eliminate the possibility of abused offenders or b) dismiss the 
importance of norms of liability in how we treat these offenders.  Neither option is broadly 
justifiable (as long as one affirms a commitment to the norms of liability).  To solve the 
problem raised by racial bias we would have to either a) eliminate the possibility of minority 
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offenders or b) dismiss the importance of skin color in how we treat these offenders.  The 
second option is not only justifiable, but arguably morally required.      
The second objection I will consider is that I have failed to take my own medicine.  I 
criticized sympathy as grounds for mercy because the appeal to sympathy did not sufficiently 
explain why one should show mercy.  One might worry that the same problem holds equally 
well on my account of grounds for mercy.  My account seems to dodge the million dollar 
question of “why be merciful?” just as much as the sympathy account.  The sympathy 
account bottoms out with an appeal to the value of being sympathetic.  My argument turns on 
an appeal to the norm of liability which calls for special concern toward those whom we have 
failed in our duties of care.  I have pointed to this norm at work in our moral lives, but not 
justified it ‘all the way down.’   
I accept that my grounds for mercy do not justify mercy ‘all the way down.’  
Normative justification must stop somewhere.  I do claim, however, that my grounds provide 
a more satisfying justification than the grounds of sympathy.  On my account, mercy is 
grounded in a shared norm rather than an emotion.  Grounding mercy in a shared norm 
allows us to substantively discuss standards of correctness for mercy.  We can make a case 
that a judge who shows mercy to an attractive person who has never suffered abuse and no 
mercy to a smelly person with a horrific childhood is wrong to do so.  On the other hand, if 
mercy is grounded in an emotion, then it admits of a great deal of individual variation and 
does not admit of standards of correctness.  All one can say to the above judge is “I would 
have felt differently.”  Grounding mercy in a shared norm rather than an emotion may make 
mercy no more or less justified from an abstract philosophic point of view, but it does make 
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mercy more justified from the point of view of the law -- a realm in which (ideally) 
arguments are made from shared standards of correctness.    
   
VI.  Extended Application 
In this section, I consider how my account of mercy applies to a variety of potential 
cases.  I have shown that mercy should be shown to abused offenders, but is it appropriate for 
other offenders?  In most cases, the answer to this question depends on the reader’s broad 
theory of justice.  I will consider the following cases:  the otherwise abused offender, the 
impoverished offender, the offender without access to health care, and the foreign offender.35 
My position entails that whenever the state stands in a relation of liability toward the 
offender, there is a prima facie case for mercy which can be rejected by a strict retributivist.  
If we cannot hope to justly reform the conditions under which the relevant duty of care was 
breached, mercy should be shown even if one is a strict retributivist.  I will begin by 
exploring the various candidates for prima facie mercy.   
Whether the state stands in a relation of liability toward the offender depends on 
whether the offender’s basic rights have been violated in a way that is causally relevant to the 
crime.  In almost every theory of justice, an offender’s basic rights are violated whenever she 
                                                 
 
35 Readers may wonder how my account of mercy applies not just to cases in criminal law, but in the theological 
context in which mercy is often discussed.  God’s mercy has often been understood as a ‘power show’ that lets 
off mere mortals on a whim or out of pity for their inferiority.  This idea is unappealing to many on the basis of 
humanist or justice concerns (Saint Anselm was particularly concerned about justice).  On my account, one can 
potentially understand God’s mercy as God choosing to respond to humans from the relation of friend or 
perhaps from the relation of a failed protector.  Mercy as the response from God as friend is particularly 
relevant in the Christian tradition in which Christ—believed to be God who stands with humans as human—
seems to make special room for mercy.  Mercy as the response from God as failed protector is particularly 
relevant for those grappling with the problem of evil (the mercy shown by the God figure to the Grand 
Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov springs to mind).  On my account of mercy, one can see 
God’s mercy as grounded in a closeness, respect, or love for humanity rather than pity which looks down upon 
humanity.  I leave it entirely to the reader, however, to decide whether this application of my account counts as 
a virtue, a vice, or an irrelevant feature of the account.        
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is severely physically abused regardless of whether the abuse happens at the hands of a 
parent, a spouse, or a perfect stranger.36 If the abuse is causally relevant to the crime (which 
it is in most cases), then it presents a prima facie case for mercy.  Note that I have provided 
no grounds for mercy for domestically abused wives who get speeding tickets or for abused 
children who fail to pay taxes.  A causal link is missing here between the state’s breach of 
duty of care and the performance of the offense.  In some theories of justice, people have a 
right to basic necessities and/or the opportunity to earn a living wage.  If an offender does not 
have access to such things (this may be true in economically depressed areas) and this 
privation is causally relevant to his crime, then he is a prima facie candidate for mercy.  In a 
few theories of justice, people have a right to access health care.  If an offender does not have 
access to health care and this privation is causally relevant to his crime, then he is a prima 
facie candidate for mercy.37  In these last two types of cases, however, it may be difficult for 
the privation to be causally relevant to the crime in a way which does not revise down the 
amount of punishment judged to be deserved as a function of the offender’s will and the 
harm caused.  If grinding poverty really leads an offender to steal food, we do not judge that 
his will is malicious or that he caused a harm on balance.  He may not deserve any 
punishment to begin with so mercy would not have a toehold.  There may be some cases 
which fit the necessary conditions here, but I suspect there are few.   
                                                 
 
36 Some theories of justice maintain that severe emotional as well as physical abuse constitutes a violation of 
basic rights.  Some theories of justice may say the offender’s rights have not been violated if she brought the 
abuse on herself.  One could arguably claim that in some cases a spouse chooses to stay in an abusive 
relationship and thus her rights are not violated.  The state has not failed this person and my grounds for mercy 
would no be applicable here.  Note that an analogous argument does not hold for young children because young 
children have no real alternative to staying with abusive parents.   
 
37 These cases are undoubtedly rare, but one is arguably presented in the movie John Q. A father who cannot 
pay for an operation for his dying son takes an emergency room hostage until a doctor performs the necessary 
operation.  Many viewers think that John should be punished, but given less punishment than he deserves as a 
function of the quality of his will and the harm he caused.   
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Suppose the relevant rights of the above candidates for mercy were violated in a 
foreign state, but the candidates commit their offense in America.  Some other country stands 
in a relation of liability toward them, but arguably America does not.  If America does not 
stand in a relation of liability toward them, then the grounds for mercy discussed in this paper 
do not apply (other grounds may nevertheless apply). If one adopts a very cosmopolitan 
theory of international justice, however, one could argue that America does stand in a 
relation of liability toward these offenders.  The violation of rights in foreign countries is no 
less America’s business than the violation of rights in America.  America stands in a relation 
of liability toward any citizen of the world whose rights have been violated.  A great deal 
more would follow from accepting this position, but a full exploration here is beyond my 
scope.   
If we cannot hope to justly reform the conditions under which the offender was failed 
in all the above scenarios, then we have more than prima facie grounds for mercy.  In these 
cases, we can argue that mercy should be shown on pain of social injustice.  Even the strict 
retributivist should show mercy in such cases.  Determining whether we can hope to justly 
reform the conditions under which the state breaches its duty of care is a complex task which 
I admittedly gave short shrift to in my discussion above.  My hunch, minus a great deal of 
relevant sociological, economic, historical, and political evidence, is that a maximally just 
state will not be able to eradicate abuse, but it will be able to able to provide all with basic 
necessities, an opportunity to earn a living wage, and access to health care.  Thus physical 
abuse is the only grounds for mercy which a strict retributivist must accept.   
 
VII.  Conclusion: 
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 Mercy is not popular in America’s criminal justice system.  Many decry mercy as not 
fit for democracy, as an archaic practice designed for monarchs to demonstrate their power 
above the law.38  In the news media, mercy has been referred to as “an abuse of power,”39 
and a “cavalier laceration of the unhealable wounds of those who mourn the victims of the 
killers.”40  I added my voice to this criticism in Part II.  If mercy is something we do simply 
out of sympathy, it invites a disregard for treating people as equals and for avoiding 
arbitrariness in practical implementation of the law.  Mercy compromises some our important 
commitments and so unless we have strong positive reason to hang on to it, we should 
compromise mercy, consign it to tales of emperors, monarchs, and knights.    
Although the argument has taken many twists and turns along the way, I hope to have 
shown that we should not compromise mercy.  We may find ourselves legitimately tempted 
to compromise mercy in the law if we understand it to be grounded in sympathy which obeys 
no rhyme or reason.  We may also be tempted to compromise mercy if we over-simplify 
responses to wrongdoing, if we think an appropriate response can be boiled down to an 
appeal to a single norm.  I have argued, however, that the appropriateness of our responses to 
wrongdoing is not so simple, but tied to the complex structure of the relations we bear to one 
another.  I have also argued that mercy can be understood not as grounded in sympathy, but 
in a relation of liability.  Understood in this sense, mercy is uncompromising:  it does not 
compromise justice, it in fact demands its place in the law on pain of injustice, and it comes 
equipped with standards of correctness.  According to those standards, the state ought to 
                                                 
 
38 Dan Markel, “Against Mercy,” Minnesota Law Review 88 (2004). 
 
39 Brian C. Crecente, “Owens Blasts Death Rove Move on TV,” Rocky Mountain News, Jan 14 2003 at 3A. 
 
40 George F. Will, “Unhealable Wounds,” Washington Post, Jan 19 2007 at B7. 
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show mercy to offenders who have been physically abused.  They do not deserve less severe 
punishment, but we cannot boast of justice unless we show them mercy.         
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